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One of the most important debates within the philosophy of literature con-
cerns the cognitive value of literature and whether this value must be con-
sidered crucial for literary appreciation. Generally, the cognitive value of
literature is understood in terms of truth and knowledge. In this way, lit-
erature is often brought into competition with science. One can argue, for
example, as did Morris Weitz and John Hospers, among others, that litera-
ture offers us truth in the same way that science does, namely by offering the
reader propositions that can be judged for their truth value.1 According to
this view, just like scientific work, literature may contain true propositions
about, for example, the human condition or the world in which we live. This
can be done explicitly, when a reader acquires knowledge about, for example,
the historical period in which a story is set, or when they learn something
about life by reading a phrase such as ‘all the world’s a stage and all the
men and women merely players’.2 Furthermore, a novel can also convey this
knowledge in an implicit way, with true propositions being derived from the
novel’s theme.
However, the propositional theory of literary truth faces many problems.
The most significant is that the propositions which can be found explicitly or
implicitly in literary works are often not meant to be true propositions about
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the real world, but have a certain function within the work of art. When,
for example, a character in a novel makes a statement about the world, this
statement is often used to tell us something about this character, rather than
about the real world.
An alternative to the propositional theory of literary truth consists in
claiming that we acquire a particular kind of knowledge by reading literary
works, a kind of knowledge we cannot acquire through science. Dorothy
Walsh, for example, claimed that literary works teach us what it is like to be
in a certain situation.3 Similarly, Martha Nussbaum stated that by reading
literary works we develop our ability ‘to see the full humanness of the people
with whom our encounters in daily life are especially likely to be superficial
at best, at worst infected by demeaning stereotypes’.4 In this way, literature
is said to provide us with knowledge about what the world looks like from a
different perspective to our own. Furthermore, one can also claim, as was done
by Catherine Wilson,5 that we can acquire conceptual knowledge by reading
literature. According to this view, we can enrich the conceptual knowledge we
already have concerning notions such as love or honour, by being confronted
with alternative interpretations of that concept in a novel.
The main difficulties with these theories is that they only seem to apply
to certain literary works, and therefore seem to be unable to provide an
account that is adequate to literary fiction in general. Moreover, they run
the risk of instrumentalising literary works, evaluating them in terms of an
external moral or conceptual aim, and in this way reducing or subordinating
the aesthetic value of literary fiction to the latter.
Another possible way to explain the novel’s cognitive value is by using an
alternative conception of truth, such as that found in hermeneutic philosophy.
Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer have claimed that
‘truth as correspondence’ is not the only possible way to talk about truth,
and that truth can also be understood in a more dynamic way – as an event,
or something that happens. Another conception of truth can be found in
the theories of Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, where truth is
understood as related to the critique of the ruling ideology. All of these
authors refer to literary works of art as eminent examples of the working of
their conceptions of truth. In this way, these theories seem better able to
explain the relationship between literature and truth than a propositional
conception of truth.
However, despite all of these attempts to explain the cognitive value of
literary works, some philosophers, such as Jerome Stolnitz and Peter Lamar-
que, remain skeptical about the importance of the novel’s cognitive value.6
These no-truth theorists claim that all of these different conceptions of cog-
nition, knowledge or truth cannot ‘compete for the high-ground of truth to
which human cognition aspires’.7 Furthermore, they doubt whether the fact
that we might discover some truths in literary works, or learn something by
reading them, means that truth must be considered a central literary value.
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They think this kind of learning should be considered accidental, a possible
side effect of reading, while the real value of literature lies in the aesthetic
experience it evokes.
Reconsidering these main references in relation to the debate on the cog-
nitive value of literary fiction, two main outcomes can be discerned. First,
the debate has been primarily formulated in terms of truth or no-truth po-
sitions. Despite new versions of the propositional theory of literary truth
recently being formulated by Kathleen Stock and Jukka Mikkonen, many al-
ternative conceptions of truth have been used to explain the cognitive value
of literature.8 Hence, the fact that different conceptions of truth are used in
this debate may explain why there seems to be little progress in resolving
it. Second, the debate has revealed the difficulty of articulating the cogni-
tive value of literary fiction as related to the aesthetic experience. According
to the no-truth position, the main feature of literary fiction is to invite the
reader to an aesthetic experience – i.e. the appreciation of a literary text as
a work of art – and precisely this aspect is neglected by the defenders of the
cognitive value of literary fiction. The difference between truth and no-truth
positions therefore seems to reflect a different appreciation of the aesthetic
value of works of literary fiction.
We do not wish to argue that the different contributions to this special
issue resolve the difficulty. Nevertheless, coming from different philosophical
traditions, they go beyond the conceptual framework of the debate between
the truth and no-truth theories and intend to shed new light on the central
question. One of the main perspectives presented in this issue concerns the
question of whether it is necessary to understand the cognitive value of lit-
erature in terms of truth or knowledge. Furthermore, while the experience
of reading literary fiction appears to be central to several contributions, the
other main perspective taken in this issue concerns the question of whether
and to what extent the cognitive value of literature can be understood as
related to literature’s aesthetic value. In this way, a number of contributions
seem to challenge – either directly or indirectly – the claims of the no-truth
theorists, while at the same time taking their critique of literary cognitivism
seriously.
The interview with Peter Lamarque and Derek Attridge which opens this
special issue, aims to summarise the stakes in the debate. To begin with, it
should be noted that, although Attridge and Lamarque developed their theo-
retical work on literature starting from very different philosophical traditions,
they often seem to share similar concerns and ideas. Furthermore, Attridge
and Lamarque share an interest in the question of what it means to read a
work of literature as a work of art, and, therefore, they both have an interest
in the aesthetic experience of literary fiction. In the course of this interview,
it becomes clear that, although Attridge and Lamarque both object in some
way to instrumental approaches to literature, they both insist on the fact that
reading literature in some way enriches our lives and thus has an important
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extra-literary value. The question, however, remains as to what extent this
value can be understood in terms of truth or knowledge.
In the first article of this special issue, ‘The Paradox of Fact from Fiction:
What Fiction Can and Can’t Tell Us About the Real World’, Todd Jones
argues that, although it is often assumed that reading fiction is an important
way to gain knowledge about the world, it is far from clear how this is possible.
Jones is thus concerned with what he calls ‘the paradox of fact from fiction’,
namely the question of how an invented fictional world can give us knowledge
about the real one. In order to answer this question, Jones focuses on two
ways in which we can obtain justificatory evidence for the beliefs we acquire
from fiction. The first way is by a ‘fiction suggests – real world attests’
process, in which a justification comes from the world external to the fiction.
The second way is a ‘resemblance-shortcut’ process, in which justification is
internal to the fiction, which means that we need to take additional steps to
ensure that the fictional world sufficiently resembles our world. By exploring
these two routes, Jones shows that, if we want to learn about the real world
from fiction, it is not sufficient for fiction to give us interesting beliefs, and
that extra work needs to be done if we want to know whether beliefs acquired
through reading fiction are justified.
In the second article, ‘Literature as Experiment: The Ontological Com-
mitment of Fiction’, Gert-Jan van der Heiden focuses on the idea that lit-
erature offers us new perspectives on the world and on ourselves, and raises
the question of what the ontological commitment of literature is in its con-
struction of another world. This question is addressed by discussing Paul
Ricoeur’s conception of literature as a space in which experiments are con-
ducted, with a critique of parts of this understanding inspired by the work
of Giorgio Agamben. As Van der Heiden shows, both Ricoeur and Agamben
state that literature creates fundamentally new forms of experience that do
not depend on the experiences offered by nature. This means that in literary
experiments, truth and existence themselves are at stake. That there are,
nevertheless, differences between Ricoeur’s and Agamben’s views becomes
clear in Van der Heiden’s discussion of Melville’s short story, Bartleby, the
Scrivener. According to Van der Heiden, this story shows us that the ex-
periments conducted by literature concern a potentiality-of-being, which is
hidden in the sheer positivity or actuality of what is – of the everyday world
we inhabit. However, what Agamben is able to show and Ricoeur not, is
the idea that in the character of Bartleby we encounter the potentiality not
to act. In this way, Van der Heiden argues that the commitment of literary
experiments is to offer an experience of being and acting differently, in which
being is experienced as potentiality-of-being, or contingency, and in which
acting is using one’s capacity not-to-act.
In ‘The Question of Literary Realism: Adorno and the Form of the Novel’,
the third article in this issue, Mario Farina focuses on the form of the novel
and its relationship to the problem of realism. By investigating the problem
4
Arthur Cools &
Leen Verheyen
of realism, Farina aims to provide a conception of the novel which is able to
justify the fact that several narrative genres with different claims about reality
are included in the same literary category by both critics and the public.
Farina develops this account by building on Theodor W. Adorno’s notion of
‘literary realism’. In this way, Farina aims to show that realism cannot be
seen as a normative stylistic stance which sometimes succeeds, sometimes
fails. Rather, reality might be expressed realistically in many different ways
depending on the historical and cultural context. In this way, realism can be
understood as the literary capacity to express and reveal the deepest structure
of reality, while it is also apparent that the means of expression have changed
throughout history.
Mojca Küplen examines the effect of narrative works of art on self-under-
standing in her article, ‘Narrative Simulation as a Route to Self-Knowledge
and Self-Development’. Central to Küplen’s argument is the idea that narra-
tive works of art offer the reader/viewer the possibility to adopt a dual first
and third-person perspective. Narrative simulations invite the reader/viewer
to connect with fictional characters on a first-person level using the vantage
point (s)he would have if (s)he were actually experiencing the events por-
trayed, while at the same time they do not directly reflect the reader’s or
viewer’s ordinary experiences. Narratives are always the result of selection,
which means that each work of narrative art brings with it a different inter-
pretation and explanation of the issues and themes it portrays. Endorsing
the emotional realism view, Küplen argues that because of this dual perspec-
tive, narrative works of art help the reader/viewer to make sense of their own
internal experiences and to recognise the meaning of these experiences in the
larger context of their life.
In the fifth article, ‘The Truth of the Story and its Variations’, Sanem
Yazıcıoğlu changes perspective and asks the question of whether it is pos-
sible to tell one’s true life story. Building on the work of Hannah Arendt,
Yazıcıoğlu argues that one’s life story presents two significant difficulties: no-
body can be the author of their own life story because the events in one’s
life are unpredictable; and nobody has sufficient distance from their own life
to guarantee that the true story is told. By focusing on these two problems,
Yazıcıoğlu emphasises the importance of the plurality of perspectives and
argues that fiction is an inseparable component of all narratives of reality.
In her article, ‘Is Literary Fiction about Truth or Meaning?’, Leen Ver-
heyen also builds on the work of Hannah Arendt and, in particular, on
Arendt’s distinction between truth and meaning. Starting from this distinc-
tion, Verheyen argues that it is a mistake to understand the cognitive value
of literature in terms of truth or knowledge. Verheyen develops an alterna-
tive account of the cognitive value of literature, which is based on the idea
that literary fiction is situated in what can be considered a ‘neutral space’.
Whereas theories defending literary cognitivism often focus on the connection
and continuity between the fictional and the real world, Verheyen focuses on
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the way in which the literary work of fiction suspends direct reference to the
real world, and the invitation this suspension offers to the reader to interpret
the story. According to Verheyen, it is this process of interpretation that
affects the readers’ frame of reference and their way of understanding the
world.
In the final article, ‘Reading for Opacity and the Cognitive Value of Lit-
erary Fiction’, Arthur Cools takes Peter Lamarque’s notion of opacity as a
starting point in order to reconsider the question of the cognitive value of
literary fiction. Following the attention given to the reader’s experience of
literary fiction, as implied by this notion, he argues that the cognitive value
of literary fiction is intrinsic to the reader’s experience and that the clarifica-
tion of this connection requires that the reader’s interest in reading literary
fiction be taken into account. He analyses the reader’s experience of literary
fiction in terms of them having an interest at a distance, and articulates the
cognitive aspects of this experience on the basis of an argument that he bor-
rows from Roman Ingarden’s reflections on the literary artwork. According to
this argument, the reader’s focus on the literary fictional narrative as a whole
is what distinguishes the experience of reading literary fiction from reading
other kinds of texts.
As is apparent from this short description of the different contributions
to this issue, the debate about the cognitive value of literary fiction is far
from resolved. The question can be approached from many original and
interesting perspectives, and bringing these perspectives together here, and
thereby revealing the variety of approaches, certainly constitutes one of the
main aims of this issue. Nevertheless, while these approaches may be new and
original, the question of the cognitive value of literary fiction requires that
we address and re-examine basic notions such as fiction, narrative, literary
work, imagination, meaning, reference, truth and cognition. In this regard,
two main tendencies in the debate can be indicated.
Generally, in the examination of the question at stake, the experience of
reading literary fiction has received more attention, whether it is in terms of
experiment or in terms of the reader’s emotional or thoughtful response to the
fictional character or world. At the same time, and probably because of this
attention given to the reader’s experience of literary fiction, it is no longer
taken for granted that the notions of truth and knowledge are the privileged
way to address the question of the cognitive value of literary fiction, especially
if defined in terms of justifiable beliefs about the real world, or in terms of an
accordance with the reader’s experience of the real world. This is also clear
from the emergence of neo-cognitivist approaches to literary fiction, which
emphasise the idea that there are ‘many forms of cognition that cannot be
explained in the standard philosophical vocabulary of knowledge acquisition,
many ways of coming to grasp the world that do not rely on my having
come into possession of a new worldly truth‘.9 This does not mean that the
notions of truth, knowledge or justified belief as such are disappearing from
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the discussion, or that there is no cognitive value to literary fiction. Rather,
the opposite seems to be the case, and literary fiction might even be seen as
an experiment which challenges our common conceptions of truth, knowledge
and justified beliefs.
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